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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
WILLIAM CHARLES DENNIS, 
Defendant-Respondent, 
vs. 
JAMES C. HOLDER, et al., 
Defendants-In-
Intervention and 
Respondents. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
No. 17267 
Appellant Government Employees Insurance Company 
strongly disagrees with numerous factual statements made 
by Respondents as well as their legal theories and analysis. 
For the convenience of this Court,Appellant will adopt the 
organizational outline utilized by Respondents in replying 
to these erroneous statements. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Respondents state that the lower court "had almost 
granted" a Motion for Directed Verdict to Respondents but 
mysteriously decided to submit the case to the jury. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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(Respondents' Brief, p. 1-2). Such a statement is both 
irrelevant and unsupported by the record in this case. 
Next, Respondents assert that Instruction No. 14 was 
erroneous since it spoke in terms of intention and required 
an examination of facts and circumstances in deriving such 
intention. Respondents then conclude that the jury found 
against them and in favor of Appellant "based on the testi-
mony of William Charles Dennis that his intentions were 
to eventually move out of his father's house and return to 
Florida." (Respondents' Brief, p. 2). Such an assertion 
is purely conjecture on the part of Respondents as to what 
elements the jury utilized in its evaluation of the residency 
question. As such, Respondents' conjecture is entitled to 
no weight whatsoever. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant does not dispute the standards outlined 
regarding appellate review of judgments notwithstanding the 
verdict. Nor does it dispute that in cases in which only 
one reasonable inference can be drawn from the facts it is 
proper to reverse a jury verdict. However, it should also 
be noted that this Court has in the majority of cases 
involving a judgment notwithstanding the verdict reversed 
the lower court and reinstated the verdict on the grounds 
that the lower court intruded upon contested issues of fact. 
See for example, Winters v. w. S. Hatch Co., 546 P.2d 603 
-2-
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(Utah 1976); Mel Hardman Production, Inc. v. Robinson, 
604 P.2d 913 (Utah 1979) and cases cited therein. Unlike 
the Kilpack case referred to by Respondents, the present 
controversy contains disputed inferences based upon undis-
puted facts which could have resulted in a verdict for either 
party. Submission to the jury was thus required. 
UNCONTROVERTED DISPOSITIVE FACTS 
Respondents refer to some twelve numbered paragraphs 
of "uncontroverted dispositive facts". (Respondents' Brief, 
P. 4-6). Subsequently they refer to "Other Facts Which Are 
Not Relevant or Material." (Respondents' Brief, p. 8-9). 
While Appellant agrees that the facts as stated were not 
disputed, Appellant strongly disagrees with the slanted and 
one-sided characterization of these facts and the complete 
omission of other facts in Appellant's favor. It is interesti:/ 
to note that all of the facts stated by Respondents in their 
twelve-numbered paragraphs were argued by them in support of 
residency. On the other hand, all facts urged by Appellant 
are either completely omitted in Respondents' Brief or are 
categorized as "not relevant or material." 
Appellant would submit that the facts listed in its 
Brief in Chief aremuch more accurate and objective in pre-
senting the evidence in support of both positions. (Appellant' 
Brief, p. 16-19). Had the facts been as one-sided and clear 
as represented by Respondents, there would be less doubt 
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that a fact question existed and that the matter could be 
determined as a question of law. However, Respondents' 
distorted view of the facts when compared with the evidence 
in the record shows that a hotly contested controversy 
existed and that numerous undisputed facts with disputed 
inferences were presented by both parties. 
ARGU~.ENT 
STATEMENT OF THE APPLICABLE LAW TO THE 
UNCONTROVERTED DISPOSITIVE FACTS. 
Respondents place great evidence on an annotation con-
tained at 93 A.L.R.3d 420-465. Portions of the annotation 
are even attached as an appendix to Respondents' Brief. 
However, Respondents have completely distorted and misquoted 
the annotation with regard to its treatment of "intentions" 
and the "inclusion" vs. "exclusion" category. (Respondents' 
Brie:', p. 7-8). 
Respondents conclude that the annotation states that 
if a child is not li "Jing apart in a separate household at 
the time in question, the parties' intentions are not material 
or relevant." (Respondents' Brief, p. 7). There is no such 
statement made in the annotation in which intention is 
excluded merely because a child is living at the insured's 
home at the time of the accident. 
Likewise, there is no discussion whatsoever contained 
in the annotation in which inclusion cases are separated from 
-4-
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exclusion cases. Rather, the annotation notes that several 
states have found the term "resident of household" ambiguous 
and have therefore applied the definition more narrowly in 
exclusion cases than in inclusion cases. liowever, no attempt 
has been made in the annotation, as have Respondents in their 
Brief, to classify the cases on this basis. 
Finally, Respondents assert there are no inclusion cases 
in which a person who is living with the insured is deemed not 
to have been a resident. The relevance of this statement 
is first, of little importance since each of the cases in 
the annotation was based upon evidence adduced at trial and 
concerned disputed facts. Second, however, the statement is 
incorrect since in the annotation itself the case of Indemnitv 
Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 36 P.2d 271 (Okla. 1934), 93 A.L.R.3d at 
440, holds that neither a daughter of the insured nor her 
husband who were staying with the insured at the time of the 
accident could be considered "residents of the same household.' 
In addition, see Pamperin v. Milwaukee Mutual Ins. Co., 197 
N.W.2d 783 (Wis. 1972) where the court held that a ~iece 
who was staying with her uncle at the time of the accident 
was not a "resident of his household." See also, Connolly v. 
Galvin, 412 A.2d 428 (N.H. 1980). 
For the preceding reasons, Appellant takes strong issue 
with the characterizations made of the annotation and believes 
that an examination of the annotation and the cases cited 
-5-
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tnerein does not support Respondents' preliminary statements 
contained in its Brief at pages 7 through 8. It should also 
be obser1ed that the "uncontroverted dispositive facts" 
referred to in this section concern those facts most favor-
able to Respondents and completely ignores, as mentioned 
supra, those facts and inferences favorable to Appellant. 
THE LOWER COURT INCORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT, AS 
A MATTER OF LAW, THE ONLY REASONABLE INFERENCE 
TO BE DRAWN FROM THE UNCONTROVERTED FACTS WAS 
THAT WILLIAM CHARLES DENNIS WAS A RESIDENT OF 
HIS FATHER'S HOUSEHOLD AT THE Tit~ OF THE 
ACCIDENT AND HENCE, AN ADDITIOtlAL INSURED UNDER 
HIS FATHER'S POLICY OF LIABILITY INSURAJ.\!CE. 
Respondents have attempted an elaborate analysis of 
the cases decided in the country regarding the question of 
residency of a household. They have divided these cases 
into the "inclusion" category in which a person is attempting 
to become an additional insured under the terms of the policy 
and the "exclusion" category in which the person, under 
other provisions of an insurance policy, is attempting not 
to be deemed a resident of the household in order that an 
action may be brought against the insured. These two cate-
gories are further broken down by the respondents to include 
cases in which the claimant is either living with the insured 
or is living away from the insured at the time of the 
accident. 
Under Respondents' analysis the question of "intention" 
is not relevant in those instances where the claimant is 
-6-
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living with the insured at the time of the accident and is 
seeking to be included under the policy. On the other hand, 
Respondents state that "intention" is relevant to cases 
involving exclusion even though the claimant is living 
with the insured and to cases of inclusion where the claimant 
is living apart from the insured. In these latter two cate-
gories Respondents believe that questions of fact are created 
while in the first category of inclusion Respondents state 
that the question is solely a matter of law. 
It is the position of Appellant that the distinctions 
and categories cited by Respondents are completely irrelevant 
to an analysis of the applicable case law and to a disposition ' 
of this case. After extensive research Appellant has been 
unable to find any authorities in which the distinctions 
made by the respondents in their Brief have been recognized. 
To the contrary, all authorities and all cases cited have 
consistently stated that each case is dependent upon an 
examination of its own facts and circumstances. 
While Appellant admits that ambiguous policy language 
can be construed narrowly or broadly in favor of an appli-
cant seeking coverage, Appellant does not concede that the 
term "resident of the same household" is in fact ambiguous 
so as to require such an interpretation. Appellant adopts 
the statement contained by the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
in which it states: 
-7-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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--
The previous decisions of this court indicate 
that no one factor is controlling and that all of 
the elements must combine to a greater or lesser 
degree in order to establish the relationship. We 
also approve the previous determination of this 
Court that the terms "resident or members of the 
same household" as used in policies of automobile 
liability insurance, are not ambiguous and, therefore, 
should be construed in light of their plain and 
common meaning. It makes no difference whether the 
terms are employed to define exclusion or inclusion 
from coverage, or whether the question is one of 
creating or terminating the relationship. Pamperin 
v. Milwaukee Mutual Ins. Co., 197 N.W.2d 783, 789 
(Wis. 1972) . (Emphasis added) . 
The Supreme Court of Connecticutt in Griffith v. Security 
Insurance Co. of Hartford, 356 A.2d 94 (Conn. 1975) has said: 
Appellee argues that the exclusion clause 
here is ambiguous and should therefore be 
construed ~ost strongly against the insurer. 
We are of the view that the exclusionary provi-
sion of the policy is clear and legally unambiguous. 
It is unnecessary to resort to rules of construc-
tion in order to ascertain the meaning of an 
insurance policy when nc ambiguity exists. 
See also, Stadelmann v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 147 N.W.2d 
460 (Mich. App. 1967); Mun Quon Kok v. Pacific Ins. Co., 
462 P.2d 909 (Haw. 1971); and Smitke v. Travelers Indemnity 
~, 118 N.W.2d 217 (Minn. 1959). 
Those courts which have treated an exclusion policy 
differently from an inclusion policy have first found the 
term to be ambiguous. Those other courts, which have not 
founj such ambiguity, have refused to make any distinction. 
Apfellant respectfully suggests that the terms "resident 
of the same household" are indeed not ambiguous and should 
-8-
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be given the common ordinary meaning contained in the 
English language without reference to the effect such 
determination has upon the policy and the claimant. 
Even assuming arguendo, however, that the term is 
ambiguous and that the rule is applicable which narrows 
the interpretation given in exclusionary policies and 
broadens it in inclusionary policies, such distinction still 
does not support the judgment N.O.V. granted by the lower 
court. In this particular instance, for example, the only 
method in which a broad interpretation of the terms could 
be applied to the facts of this case concerned the instruc-
tions to the iury given by the lower court. In other words, 
it is only by the definition applied to the term "resident 
of the same household" by which a broad or narrow definition 
can be established. The jury then utilizing such definition 
applies the law to the facts of the case in reaching its 
conclusion. 
Instruction No. 14 correctly stated the standard to 
be applied even in a case in which a broad interpretation of 
the term is utilized. As will be noted infra there is no 
authority which states that intention is not a relevant factor 
in determining coverage even when the policy is broadly 
interpreted. In addition, Respondents have filed no cross-
appeal from this instruction and so, for the purposes of 
this appeal, the instruction must be considered correct. 
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As such, therefore, the jury was correctly instructed 
as to the standard to be applied in determining residency 
even under a broad interpretation given to inclusionary 
policies where ambiguous language is deemed to have existed. 
Respondents throughout the argument portion of their 
brief continually state two propositions: (1) That as a 
matter of law cases can be decided where the claimant is 
living with the insured in inclusionary cases and (2) that 
intention of the claimant is not relevant in inclusion 
cases in which the claimant is living with the insured. 
The chart contained in Respondents' Brief (p. 16-17) 
is both erroneous and misleading in these respects. First, 
it is only Respondents themselves who have made the distinc-
tions and categories contained in the chart. The courts 
themselves have failed to apply these elaborate distinctions 
as have all legal authorities discovered by Appellant. 
Second, Respondents have in numerous cases stated "no jury" 
but have failed to note that the decision was that of a 
fact finder judge and that the findings of the judge were 
reviewed by the appellate court just as would be a verdict 
from a jury. Third, the characterizations in many of the 
cases that intention was not relevant or considered is 
incorrect. 
A review of all of these cases shows that with only two 
exceptions the circumstances and facts of each case determined 
-10-
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the outcome regardless of whether it was an ''inclusion case" 
or an "exclusion case" and whether the claimant was living 
with the insured or was away from the insured. As noted 
in Appellant's Brief in Chief, the conflicting inferences 
existing in this case clearly required a fact finder to make 
a determination based upon the evidence and the applicable 
definitions. 
A brief review of the cases listed in Respondents' chart 
and the errors contained therein is as follows: 
l. Buddin v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. The Supreme 
Court of South Carolina reversed a jury verdict in which a 
nephew was deemed not to be a resident of his uncle's house. 
The court noted that a judgment N.O.V. should only be granted 
if the evidence is susceptible to only one reasonable infer~a 
The court then noted the facts of that case including that t~ 
nephew had no other place to go, had no furniture except at 
his uncle's, ate all his food there, and had no intention 
of looking for another place or moving. 157 S.E.2d 635. 
The court failed to note a single factor opposing or con-
tradicting residency in direct contrast to the instant case. 
The court then concluded: 
In our opinion, under the cases cited, there 
were no factual issues in this case for the jury 
to resolve. The evidence here is susceptible of 
on~y one reasonable inference. Id. at 637. 
It should be noted that the court made no distinction between 
-11-
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inclusion or exclusion and the fact that the nephew was 
actually living with the uncle at the time of the accident. 
This case simply stands for the proposition that since 
there were no facts to the contrary, there was no factual 
determination necessary. 
2. Hardware Mutual v. Horne Indemnity Co. The decision 
in this case involved the findings of the trial court as a 
fact finder. The lower court found that a nephew was a 
resident of his aunt and uncle's home. It was not decided 
as a matter of law. The court also noted that the term 
"residence" means "a temporary or permanent dwelling place, 
abode, or habitation to which one intends to retur~ as 
distinguished from a place of ternpo=ary sojourn on transient 
visit." 50 Cal. Rptr. at 515. 
3. Jamestown Mutual Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. 
C8. Again, this appeal involved a review of findings of 
fact by the lower court in which it was determined that a 
son was a relative in his father's household. As noted by 
the appellate court: 
William Clark Hamrick had no home of his own. 
He went back to his father's house, carrying with 
him all of his possessions. His intent was to 
remain there until living quarters more convenient 
to his employment could be found and the living 
arrangements made for his occupancy of them. 
We think it clear that under the circumstances he 
was a "resident of the same household" as his 
father. He is not in the same position as an 
adult child who has a home of his own to which 
-12-
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he intends to return and is making a mere 
visit to his parents. 147 S.E.2d at 417. 
(Emphasis added) . 
3A. It should be noted that the Pamperin case should 
have been included in the first category of "living with 
inclusion cases" contained in Respondents' chart but was 
erroneously put in the "exclusion" cases. To maintain ease 
of comparison, Appellant will discuss this case in its 
present position. 
4. United Services Automobile Assn. v. Mione. Again, 
this was a case tried before a judge who made specific 
findings and conclusions as to whether a daughter was a 
resident of her father's household. The court noted: 
Important factors are the subjective or 
declared intent of the individual, the relation-
ship between the individuals and the members of 
the household, the existence of a second place 
of lodging, and the relative permanence or 
transient nature of the individual's residence 
in the household. 528 P.2d at 420. 
The court noted no distinction between children living with 
their parents and children separated from their parents in 
applying this test. 
5. Hardesty v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. 
This case is quoted extensively in Appellant's main brief. 
It stands for the proposition, as evidenced by the second 
remand, that the residency of an individual is a question of 
fact and not a matter of law. Since there were two potential 
homes in this case, just as in the instant case, the sole 
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question to be determined was whether the claimant was a 
resident of the insured's household. The additional 
residence always makes the determination a more difficult 
question than when there is no other living quarters 
available to the claimant as in several of the other cases 
cited. 
6. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Means. This case 
was also extensively cited in Appellant's Brief in Chief. 
Again, the court made no distinction in applying a different 
standard to a case in which the minor had left the residence 
as to cases where the minor resided at the residence. The 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, after reviewing the undisputed 
facts, noted the disputed inferences stating: 
There are many cases where a contract of insur-
ance may be construed as a matter of law and the 
question of liability vel non decided as such by 
the court. There are other cases where there is 
a conflict in the evidence er where different 
inferences are permissible under the uncontroverted 
evidentiary facts. In the latter kind of situation 
the issue is a fact issue and one which is properly 
submitted to the jury. 382 F.2d at 29. 
7. American States Ins. Co. v. Walker. Again, Respon-
dents failed to note that this Court affirmed the findings 
of fact entered by the lower court. In that decision, 
this Court failed to note any substantial difference in 
standard because a child is living or not living at the 
residence at the time of the accident. This Court noted 
the following: 
-14-
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A resident of a household is one who is a 
member of a family who lives under the same roof. 
Residence emphasizes membership in a group rather 
than an attachment to a building. It is a matter 
of intention and choice rather than one of geo-
graphy. 
The trial court heard the evidence and made 
a finding that at the time of the collision Dixie 
Ann Walker was still a resident of her father's 
household. Whether we would have made the same 
ruling had we tried the case is immaterial, and 
on appeal we are not justified in substituting our 
judgment for his, since the evidence was such as 
to sustain his judgment. 486 P.2d at 1044. 
8. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Granillo. The Granillc 
case was one in which summary judgment was granted on the 
basis that the affidavit and exhibit showed no dispute as 
to facts or inferences. In that case no discussion was made 
by the court as to a different standard applied to exclusion 
cases vs. inclusion cases. There, the married daughter of 
a service man had moved into her parent's home. The facts 
reviewed by the court are remarkably similar to the facts in 
the instant case. The daughter in Granillo intended to resi~ 
in her parent's home only until she could afford to rent her 
own home, did not consider herself a member of the family 
and her father considered her a guest in his home. The court 
noted that the girl's car was never used by the family nor 
the family's car by the girl. The court also observed she 
brought neither furniture nor other possessions with her when 
whe left her home in Yuma. The court stated that the intended 
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duration of a relationship is a fact to be considered in 
such cases. Again, the court failed to note any different 
standard which would have been applied had there been an 
inclusion question rather than an exclusion question. 
9. Pamperin v. Milwaukee Mutual Ins. Co. As noted 
supra, this case should have been included in the inclusion 
living together category. The court in this case held as a 
matter of law that a niece who was staying with her uncle 
was not an insured under his policy. Thus, this case is the 
exact opposite of the 3uddin case in which that court held 
as a matter of law that the nephew was a resident. The court 
noted that there were three factors to be considered in 
determining residency of a household. (l) Living under 
the same roof; (2) in a close, intimate and informal relation-
ship; and (3) where the intended duration is likely to be 
substantial. The court stated: 
Living together under one roof as a family is 
neither the sole nor the controlling test of whether 
a person is a resident or member of a household. In 
addition, the intended duration of the relationship 
is a necessary element whether the atte~pt is to show 
the creation or the termination of the relationship. 
197 N.W.2d at 787. 
10. National Farmers Union Property and Casualty Co. 
v. Maca. Respondents incorrectly state the conclusion reached 
in the Maca case. In that case on summary judgment the court 
held that the son was a resident of his father's household 
and could not sue his father. The facts were undisputed by 
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the claimants and therefore the court held that the record 
established, as a matter of law, that the son who had no 
other quarters and who intended on remaining with his father 
indefinitely was indeed a resident of his father's household. 
A review of the preceding cases in the chart formulated 
by the respondents shows that in almost every instance the 
question of residency was one of fact, not law. In those 
few cases in which the court ruled as a matter of law as 
to residency, the facts and inferences were held to be 
undisputed and incapable of more than one conclusion. In 
such cases there was no separate living quarters or other 
circumstances in which conflicting inferences could be made. 
Respondents have attempted to create categories of cases 
which are not recognized in any of the opinions cited by 
Respondents or in any legal authority. The distinction be-
tween inclusion and exclusion cases is only applied by courts 
in those cases in which the terms are deemed to be ambig~ous 
and where the definitions themselves are either enlarged or 
restricted. Such definitions are in the form of jury 
instructions which, in the instant case, must be considered 
correct since Respondents have failed to cross-appeal from 
the instructions given. 
The distinction attempted by Respondents makes little 
sense. Under Respondents' analyses if a son visits his 
parents for three days and intends on returning the following 
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day he would be automatically included under his father's 
policy as an additional insured since he "resided under 
his father's roof" on the day of the accident regardless of 
his intention of leaving the following day. Taking the same 
facts, however, into an exclusion case, according to the 
Respondents, would require an examination of the son's inten-
tion and a finding that he was not a resident of the house-
hold since he did not intend on staying. 
Likewise, if the son went to his own apartment the 
following day and then became involved in an accident 
Respondents would urge that a new standard be applied since 
he was not then residing under his father's roof. Then, his 
intention and future plans would again come into play even 
though had he had the accident the previous night before 
leaving his father's home his intention would have been 
irrelevant. 
Such an analysis is obviously falacious. The standards 
to be applied in determining residency of a household are 
applicable in all situations regardless of whether an inclu-
sion, exclusion, living apart from the insured or living 
with the insured is present. If the court chooses to narrow 
the definitional terms involved in defining residents of a 
household that is the court's prerogative under ambiguous 
insurance policies. However, there are no cases which say 
that intention is eliminated completely in narrowing the 
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definitional standard. 
It should also be considered that insurance policies 
are written and premiums are paid based upon the intention 
of the insuring parties. In the present case, for example, 
Donald Dennis, the father of William Dennis, some two weeks 
before the accident failed to change his application of 
insurance to list his son as an additional driver of the 
family automobile. (Tr. 490, Exhibit 4). The testimony is 
also consistent that his father considered his son only to 
be residing at the residence until he could get enough money 
to go back to Florida and that he had an understanding with 
his son that he would only stay there long enough to get him-
self straightened out. (Tr. 498). 
The obvious purpose of such a clause is to restrict 
the number of insureds which a premium goes to protect. If 
intended duration is not a factor to be considered, as urged 
by Respondents, then any relative who happens to be lucky 
enough to be residing in an insured's home on the night of 
the accident would automatically receive coverage. Such a 
standard makes no sense in law or logic and the distinctions 
attempted to be made by Respondents are not valid or recognize: 
under the authorities. 
For these reasons, the trial court erred in overruling 
the jury verdict finding of non-residency when the inferences 
in this case were clearly disputed and in which intention of 
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the insured was clearly an issue of relevance. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents in their brief have attempted to divert 
this Court's attention to the real issue in this case 
which is whether there was sufficient conflict of factual 
inferences to justify submission to a jury. Instead, 
Respondents have attempted to create and categorize selected 
cases into a pattern for the purpose of trying to show that 
under the facts of this case the question is one of law 
and not fact. 
A reading of the cases cited by the respondents showed 
that they have distorted and mischaracterized numerous 
decisions for the purpose of neatly fitting them into the 
niches developed under Repondents' theory. In most cases, 
however, the cases fit the theory as well as round pegs in 
square holes. 
A review of the numerous cases throughout the United 
States and this Court's own case in Walker shows unequivocably 
that the facts of each case are the critical and sole focus 
of decision. Only in rare instances where there is virtually 
no evidence opposing the contention of residency has the 
matter been decided as a question of law and not fact. 
The jury in this case was given an instruction which 
<0ven Respondents admit was basically correct. Respondents' 
only complaint as to the definitional terms concerns the 
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question of intent. As noted throughout this Brief, however, 
Respondents have cited no authority showing that intent is 
not an element in all cases including inclusion "living 
together" cases. 
As such, the jury evaluated the record and concluded 
that William Dennis was merely staying with his family on 
a temporary basis to overcome a drug dependency, that his 
family did not consider him to be a member of the family but 
merely a guest for a short duration, that all of his ties 
including personal and possessional were in Florida, that 
at the time of the accident he had a separate apartment in 
Florida where the majority of his possessions were kept, that 
as far as Dennis himself was concerned, he had a household 
in Florida and wanted to return to it from the day he arrived 
in Utah and on the day of the accident itself. 
While Respondents can cite contrary inferences and facts 
in their favor, it was for the jury, not the trial court, to 
decide which set of facts established the "residency of the 
same household" as contained in the insurance policy. The 
lower court was obviously swayed by Respondents' categoriza-
tion effort in persuading the lower court that in cases 
involving a child living at home in which iaclusion is being 
sought there is no question of fact present and the child 
is automatically deemed to be a resident. 
The lower court's conclusion is not supported by any 
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authority cited in these briefs. While admittedly the scope 
of definition can be extended or restricted by a court in 
ambiguous insurance policies, there are no decisions which 
state that factual examination is not relevant in cases 
where the child is living at home and claims inclusion. The 
repeated assertions in support of this theory by the respon-
dents are simply not supported by any legal authorities or, 
by even common sense. 
For the preceding reasons, therefore, Appellant respect-
fully submits that this Court reinstate the jury verdict and 
remand the case to the district court for entry of the 
appropriate order. 
Respectfully submitted. 
HANSON, RUSSON, HANSON & DUNN 
OyD~~ 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
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